I have always been fascinated by the "Middle Road" philosophy, somewhat inspired by Aristotle's "Ethics", and in more modern times, by Popper's approach to social processes. In the specific context of national security strategy and intelligence, I am constantly thinking about the balance between conservatism and innovation. Between remembering the past, yet understanding that history never truly repeats itself. Never preparing for the previous war, yet acknowledging that not

Many articles have been written in recent years about the protracted nature of wars, and the illusion of short and decisive wars. Many of them, such as this one, or this one, and even this one, were written from an American perspective. They discussed lessons from the war in Ukraine, and offered recommendations for a future conflict with China. The current conflict between the US and Iran, which has been taking place for 6 months, also illustrates the protracted nature of war

Yes. I know. As an intelligence practitioner, I always tried to avoid the "tyranny of current intelligence". And when I became an intelligence scholar, I read numerous books and articles admiring "estimative intelligence" or "strategic intelligence" and looking down on current intelligence. "Current" sounded like "simple", "tactical", or "flat". Something more similar to new reporting to true and deep intelligence analysis. But as always, I try to adopt the Middle Road philos

About 4 years ago, I started writing an academic article about lessons which can be learned from the Yom Kippur War. This article was tragically published just several months prior to the colossal Israeli failure of October 7th, 2023. As we once again approach Yom Kippur, this is a good time to reflect about the conclusions of that article. I have conducted such reflection many times in recent years. But here I want to focus on one specific lesson, which unfortunately was als

As you might have noticed if you have been following my work, I am very much focused on understanding Intelligence Cultures and Strategic Cultures. Not just of adversaries, but also of partners and friends, and of course, our own cultures. In recent months, I am increasingly operationalizing this line of research, both in National Security and in Business. For instance, when I discuss Israeli National Intelligence Culture with intelligence professionals, and especially when I

Consistency. Such a strong word. Many of us, at least in Western cultures, were raised on a mindset where consistency is a must. You can't constantly change your thoughts or opinions. You have to stick to your practical choices. If you're not consistent, you're just "blowing in the wind". Your backbone might break. Philosophically, this is an Enlightment-influenced cultures, and even somewhat scientific-influenced. For practitioners of Strategy and Intelligence, in national

We are all familiar with the traditional approaches to knowledge or problems,. The traditional "Intelligence Cycle", for instance, is all about Known Unknowns. We know what we are looking for, and we know that knowledge is missing. Now we have to collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate. Extremely relevant for tactical and operational intelligence, in national security and in business. AI is a force multiplier here. The age of data has highlighted the value of Unknown Known

In recent years I have written quite a bit about the challenges facing strategic intelligence, including what I see as a declining demand for this type of intelligence, at least in Israelן and the US national security. Many others have written about similar issues. For instance, an article by Me'ir Finkel which discusses this from a cognitive perspective. Another interesting article in Hebrew criticizes the notion of "strategic early warning". And in my private sector intelli